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JOHN P. GRACEFFA* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, government employment has provided the law 
school graduate with a legal apprenticeship more common to an ear­
lier era. Although such practical experience is advantageous, there 
are some unseen aspects of government employment that should be 
considered by the neophyte lawyer. The lawyer entering govern­
ment service should look not only to the present but also to the fu­
ture, when he will be entering or reentering private practice. The 
purpose of this article is to explore the ethical considerations facing 
the government lawyer about to enter private practice. Similar con­
siderations apply to the new lawyer presently contemplating govern­
ment service. Particular attention will be given to the conflicting 
public policies that arise whenever courts consider the ethical 
problems encountered by a government lawyer entering private 
practice. The article then will examine the approaches frequently 
employed to maintain a balance between these conflicting policies. l 
The undercurrent in this area is one in which ethical standards 
• Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; B.A., 
Eastern Nazarene College, 1975, J.D., Suffolk University Law School, 1979. This article 
represents the opinions and legal conclusions of its author and does not necessarily repre­
sent opinions or legal conclusions of the Department of the Attorney General. Opinions 
of the Attorney General are formal documents rendered pursuant to specific statutory 
authority. 
1. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated en hanc, 625 F.2d 
433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other groundr mem., 101 S. Ct. 911 (1981) ("[t]he formula­
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generally applicable to the private attorney also regulate the govern­
ment lawyer. Additionally, the federal lawyer is a representative of 
the federal government, the composite of the people, and thus has an 
even greater responsibility.2 The government lawyer rises from his 
obligation to the bar ultimately to constitute a symbol ofgovernment 
itself. The government attorney, in addition to being a symbol of 
government, also is charged with the awesome responsibility of 
maintaining the integrity of government bodies.3 That responsibility 
must not be taken lightly, as it forms the ethical foundation of the 
government from which the moral fabric of our society is partially 
sewn. No government, however, is capable of defining the limits of 
right and wrong conduct. The terms are relative to the particular 
context of historical movement and the meanings shift as the subjec­
tive needs of the individual and the objective needs of society 
evolve.4 In more practical terms, the government attorney must 
work within the ethical framework of justice and reflect the ethical 
conscience of society. Nevertheless, government service also pro­
vides the attorney with the unique opportunity to be an instrument 
of constructive change. 5 
Before considering the detailed ethical problems, it also is im­
portant to remember that ethical rules are largely a function of his­
torical developments and changing social mores. Thus, ethical 
standards should not be etched in stone. Rather, ethical standards 
should remain flexible so that they can conform to prevailing societal 
values.6 
tion of standards concerning the future employment of government attorneys involves a 
careful weighing of competing concerns"). , 
2. Fahy, Special Ethical Prohlems ofCounselfor the Government, 33 FED. B.J. 331, " 
332 (1974). 
3. Kaplan, Forhidden Retainers, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 914, 920 (1956) (faith of the 
general public in the integrity of government bodies is essential). 
4. F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: BEING PART THREE OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES §§ 488-552 (1830). 
5. Comment, Conjiictsof Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 GEO. 
L.J. 1025, 1025-26 (1977) (stability of government depends upon public confidence in the 
justice system which attorneys inspire through strict adherence to high ethical principles). 
6. General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(standards of Canon 9 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility as to what creates 
an appearance of evil is largely a question of current ethical legal mores); O. HOLMES, 
The Bar As A Profession, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 156 (1920). See generally Note, 
Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons ofEthics and Intra-Firm Conflicts of 
Interests, 73 YALE L.J. 1058 (1964). 
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II. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CONSIDERATIONS 
The standards reflecting current thought on ethical problems 
are found in the American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Profes­
sional Responsibility (the Code). The structure of the Code is com­
prised of canons, which are axiomatic norms; ethical considerations 
(EC's), which are aspirational in nature; and disciplinary rules 
(DR's), which are mandatory.7 This conceptual framework illus­
trates the essential thrust of the Code: The drafters, recognizing the 
difficulty in formulating concrete ethical rules, provided both general 
statements of conduct and aspirational guidelines. Conversely, the 
drafters, cognizant of the need for minimum standards, designed cer­
tain mandatory rules. The interplay within this system gives the 
lawyer sufficient room to exercise his professional judgment without 
undue fear of violating the Code. Generally, the Code is given great 
weight by the courts8 and is fully applicable to government lawyers.9 
A. lJR 9-101(B) 
DR 9-101(B), the most relevant section of the Code concerning 
the former government lawyer, provides that "a lawyer shall not ac­
cept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial re­
7. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1980). The American 
Bar Association currently is circulating for comment the ABA MODEL RULES OF PRO­
FESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). Where appropriate, citations to 
the proposed rule and comment will be given if the proposed rule constitutes a variation 
from the Code. 
8. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976) (Code 
carries great weight in court's examination of attorney's conduct); City of Cleveland v. 
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 206 (N.D. Ohio) (judicial notice 
taken of the standards of professional conduct proclaimed in the Code), affd, 570 F.2d 
123 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). But see Silver Chrysler Plymouth, 
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1975) (no need to distinguish 
between partners and associates on the basis of title alone as both are bound by the same 
Code of Professional Responsibility) (overruled on the question of appealability by Arm­
strong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded mem., 
101 S. Ct. 911 (1981) and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 101 S. Ct. 669 (1981». 
9. Jordan, Ethical Issues Arising From Present or Past Government Service, in PRO­
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 171, 172 (1978) (suggesting the Code may apply to both 
purely private matters and matters connected with government service since problems of 
confiicting interests, of switching sides, of abuse ofclient confidences, and ofappearances 
of impropriety exist in the private as well as in the public context). 
The Model Rules contain a "Government Lawyer Confiict of Interest" section as 
well as a reference to "the legal department of a government agency" within the defini­
tion of "law firm." ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (Discus­
sion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). The comments to this section explicitly state that the 
government lawyer is subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. Definitions. 
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sponsibility while he was a public employee."lo The applicable rule 
under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) 
is termed differently but substantially is similar in meaning to DR 9­
IOI(B).1I 
The complexity of problems that DR 9-IOI(B) creates for the 
government attorney and the difficulties confronting a court in 
resolving ethical issues under DR 9-101(B) are compounded by the 
presence of strongly conflicting public policies. A strict disqualifica­
tion standard under DR 9-IOI(B) will both deny the client his choice 
of counsel and impair the government's ability to attract qualified 
attorneys by imposing an overbroad restriction upon former govern­
ment lawyers entering private practice. The public undoubtedly will 
suffer if qualified attorneys are dissuaded from public service by the 
imposition of a rigid and overbroad disqualification standard under 
DR 9-IOI(B).12 These considerations, therefore, implicate strong 
public policies concerning both the availability of professional serv­
ices and competence in government. 13 Balanced against these poli­
cies is the interest in preventing, through the enforcement of DR 9­
IOI(B), the government attorney from "wield[ing] Government 
power with a view toward subsequent private gain."14 In light of 
these conflicting public policies, an attempt to formulate a rule of 
general application regarding disqualification under DR 9-IOI(B) is 
inappropriate}S Instead, "[t]he formulation of standards concerning 
the future employment of government attorneys involves a careful 
weighing of competing concerns."16 
10. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-IOI(B) (1980). 
II. "A lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in 
which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or em­
ployee." Id. Rule l.ll(a). The major difference between DR 9-IOI(B) and Rule l.ll(a) 
is the "participated personally" language in the new rule. Id. This language effectively 
narrows the rule to matters in which the government lawyer was directly involved and 
eliminates the problem of outright disqualification of an entire department. 
12. Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and tne Canons ofProfeSSional Etn­
ics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657, 668 (1957). Judge Kaufman suggests that the government, as 
a former client, must be protected. If the restrictions, however, are too broad, profes­
sional sterilization will develop, ultimately discouraging government service. 
13. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated en hanc, 625 
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on otner grounds and remanded mem., 101 S. Ct. 91l 
(1981). 
14. General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650 n.20 (2d Cir. 
1974). 
15. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated en hanc, 625 
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on otner grounds and remanded mem., 101 S. Ct. 91l 
(1981). 
16. Id. at 32. 
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Realizing the necessity to strike a balance between the policy of 
preventing abuse of government employment on the one hand and 
the public interest in attracting qualified attorneys for government 
service and preserving a client's choice of counsel on the other, the 
courts have applied DR 9-101(B) only after careful and thorough 
consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case. For ex­
ample, in Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Telephone CO.,17 the court was 
faced with a motion to disqualify an attorney from representing an 
interconnect company that was suing a telephone company for anti­
trust violations. IS The court noted that plaintiff's attorney, a former 
deputy attorney general for the State of Hawaii, previously had been 
involved in a state action against the telephone company for anti­
trust violations.l9 The court, however, did not automatically dis­
qualify the attorney. Instead, the court made a painstaking 
examination of the memoranda and affidavits from both actions and 
concluded that the present action paralleled the earlier state action.20 
The importance of Telos lies in the careful analysis made by the 
court. Implicit in the court's decision was a recognition of the com­
peting policy considerations of ensuring ethical conduct on the part 
of lawyers, on one hand, and the litigant's right to freely chosen 
counsel on the other. This recognition is a necessary step in making 
the Code work.21 In addition, a balancing approach will sharpen the 
focus of the problem and point to the solution.22 
Many of the solutions proposed to reconcile the inherent con­
flicts underlying disqualification of an attorney under DR 9-101(B) 
17. 397 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Hawaii 1975). 
18. /d. at 1315. 
19. Id. at 1316. 
20. Id. at 1315-16. 
21. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976) (the more 
frequently litigant is delayed or disadvantaged by disqualification of his lawyer under the 
appearance of impropriety doctrine, the greater the likelihood of public suspicion). See 
also Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(painstaking analysis of facts and precedents necessary); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland 
Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 196 (N.D. Ohio) (ethical problems cannot be 
resolved in the abstract and decisions require a thorough consideration of the facts), aJid, 
570 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1977), cerro denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). 
22. Note, Attorney's Conflict ofInterests: Representation ofInterest Adverse to That 
ofFormer Client, 55 B.U.L. REV. 61, 77-78 (1975). The disqualification of a former gov­
ernment attorney not only protects government secrets, but also ensures that government 
positions will not be utilized for private gain. Certain theories of disqualification, how­
ever, such as "access to related information", may prevent an attorney from ever practic­
ing in his area of expertise. In this context, the doctrine of ''vertical responsibility" acts 
as a counterweight which limits the "access" theory. Id. 
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are neither well formulated nor frequently used.23 In United States v. 
Standard Oil CO.,24 the court perceived the problem as an identifica­
tion of the matters in which the attorney previously was involved 
rather than as an identification of the government as the former cli­
ent.25 The test is whether it was likely that the attorney previously 
would have attained factual knowledge of the matter in contro­
versy.26 This test, developed by Judge Kaufman,27 is a compromise 
between the harshness of absolute attorney disqualification and the 
need to protect the former client.28 The difficulty with the Kaufman 
approach is the degree of proof required to show factual involve­
mentby the attorney while employed by the government. 29 One so­
lution offered to overcome this difficulty is simply to presume the 
existence of attorney-client confidentiality between all former gov­
ernment attorneys and the federal government.30 
The second inquiry under DR 9-101(B) is whether the attorney 
involved in the potential appearance of impropriety actually is em­
ployed by the present plaintiff or defendant. Several disqualification 
motions have been defended on the basis that no private employ­
ment existed between the former government lawyer and the present 
plaintiff.3I Private employment, however, has been broadly inter­
preted. It has been held that there is private employment irrespec­
tive of the side chosen in private practice32 and that no fee 
arrangement is necessary in order to establish a private employment 
relationship.33 The courts, then, have given little credence to the 
lack of private employment defense. Private employment should be 
defined narrowly only if there is an actual appearance of 
23. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 814 (5th Cir. 1976) (two 
kinds of misconduct most prevalent are situations in which private representation calls 
into question a lawyer's conduct while a public official and those in which a lawyer's 
association with the government gives him an improper advantage). 
24. 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
25. Id. at 350-51. 
26. Id. at 361-62. The comments to the Model Rules echo this factual approach to 
"matter" and distinguish between direct involvement in a specific transaction and recur­
rent involvement with the same issue for a client. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1-10 comment (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). 
27. 136 F. Supp. at 361-62. 
28. Id. at 353-55. 
29. Id. 
30. Note, supra note 22, at 72. This presumption is better suited to the preliminary 
stages than to an indepth factual showing. 
31. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650 (2d Cir. 
1974); Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (D. Hawaii 1975). 
32. General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650 (2d Cir. 1974). 
33. Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (D. Hawaii 1975). 
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impropriety.34 
A third question in the disqualification analysis addresses the 
problem of identifying precisely the matters within the knowledge of 
the former government lawyer. The obvious situation arises when 
the former government lawyer personally handled the government's 
case.3S The situation, however, is less obvious when knowledge of 
the government's case is imputed to the attorney due to the basic 
configuration of the government legal office. When an attorney is 
responsible for a government office or subdivision, knowledge of the 
proceedings undertaken by his juniors is imputed to him.36 Along 
with this vertical standard of imputed knowledge, there also exists a 
horizontal standard of imputed knowledge. This standard is applied 
when two or more government attorneys of equal rank are in­
volved.37 The doctrine of imputed knowledge has been accepted 
readily by some courts, and its application has resulted in the dis­
qualification of former government lawyers.38 One federal district 
court suggested that the doctrine is relevant in large law firms in the 
private sector.39 
There has been an undercurrent of dissent regarding adoption 
of the imputed knowledge doctrine. The basis of dissent concerns 
the public policy consideration against imposing undue restrictions 
upon former government lawyers entering private practice. The po­
tential severity of restrictions resulting from an application of this 
34. But see Note, Legal Ethics-The ABA Code ofProfessional Responsibility-Dis­
ciplinary Rule 9-101(B)-Former Government Allorneys and the Appearance ofEvil Doc­
trine-General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 651, 
656-57,662 (1975) (phrase "private employment" should be interpreted so as to prevent 
government lawyers from concentrating on cases which might provide future gain, which 
DR 9-IOI(B) was intended to prevent). 
35. See, e.g., United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 118-20 (5th Cir. 1964) 
(attorney, formerly employed by the Internal Revenue Service who handled income tax 
claims against defendants, disqualified from representing defendants in suits for foreclo­
sure of liens for balance due on unpaid taxes); Allied Realty, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l 
Bank, 283 F. Supp. 464, 465-66 (D. Minn. 1968), qfJ'd, 408 F.2d 1099, 1100-01 (8th Cir.) 
(attorney, formerly employed as Assistant United States Attorney who had participated 
in the investigation and trial of three former employees of defendant bank, disqualified 
from representing plaintiff in a subsequent action against the bank because he was utiliz­
ing information previously acquired in subsequent receivership action), cert. denied, 396 
U.S. 823 (1969). 
36. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
37. Id. 
38. Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132, 134 (W.D. Wash. 1946) (attorneys employed 
by defendants in Price Administrator's suit disqualified under imputed knowledge doc­
trine because they had been employed by the Office of Price Administration). 
39. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 211 
(N.D. Ohio), aJid, 570 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). 
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doctrine is obvious.40 Therefore, continued use of the imputed 
knowledge doctrine will depend on whether the possibility of harsh 
results can be minimized through compromise. Perhaps realizing 
this, Judge Kaufman delineated a more precise standard of imputed 
knowledge that depends on the test of substantial responsibility as 
determined by a quantum of connecting factors.41 The substantial 
responsibility analysis is two-pronged: It requires an examination of 
the lawyer's activities as a government attorney and a determination 
of what knowledge may be imputed to him. 
Determining a lawyer's activities as a government attorney and 
what knowledge may be imputed to him are inseparable considera­
tions; both concern the nature of the work performed while em­
ployed by the government. Judge Kaufman addressed this issue in 
General Motors Corp. v. City of New York.42 In General Motors, 
New York City brought an action alleging that General Motors had 
attempted to monopolize trade and commerce through the manufac­
ture and sale of city buses in violation of the antitrust laws.43 New 
40. See generally Comment, Business as Usual· The Former Government Attorney 
and ABA lJisciplinary Rule 5-105(lJ) , 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1537, 1540-43 (1977) (because 
vertical responsibility test glosses over difference between the involvement and responsi­
bility of a subordinate versus that of a supervisor, a more precise test should examine the 
former employee to determine whether his responsibility in a matter in conjunction with 
his personal involvement constitutes substantial responsibility). Rule 7.1 deals with the 
problem of changing associations and subsequent vicarious disqualification due to client 
confidence and/or adverse representation problems. The comments discuss the disad­
vantages of per se rules of disqualification and endorse a "functional analysis." ABA 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 comment (Discussion Draft, Jan. 
30, 1980). The two functions are to preserve client confidences and to avoid positions 
adverse to a client. Although Rule l.ll(e) specifically addresses disqualification of the 
firm of an already disqualified former government attorney, the comments to Rule 7.1 
also are relevant since a "law firm" within this rule inc~),ldes a government legal depart­
ment. These comments echo three significant points whii:l!: recur throughout the Model 
Rules. First, preservation of client confidences is paramount. Second, switching sides in 
any sense is forbidden. Third, in any analysis under these rules, the approach will be 
thorough and factual. 
41. Kaufman, supra note 12, at 665-66. Employees must be determined on an ad 
hoc basis because whether information reached the attorney will vary from agency to 
agency and job to job. Moreover, horizontal imputation of knowledge between depart­
ment heads also must be determined by an ad hoc test based upon the likelihood of the 
attorney receiving the information. Finally vertical imputation from subordinates to su­
pervisory officials of work done by subordinates is absolutely essential to avoid the ap­
pearance of evil. Id. The Model Rules incorporate the substantial responsibility 
standard by requiring both personal and substantial participation of a public lawyer 
before he may be disqualified. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 
l.ll(a) (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). 
42. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974). 
43. Id. at 641. 
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York City retained George D. Reycraft as its attomey.44 A former 
employee of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, 
Reycraft had worked on a government suit against General Motors 
alleging monopolization of the city bus business.4s General Motors 
moved to disqualify Reycraft from the case under DR 9-101(B).46 
Judge Kaufman found that Reycraft had substantial responsibility in 
initiating the government's antitrust claim against General Motors.47 
Judge Kaufman reasoned that because Reycraft had been assigned 
to the case, had signed the complaint, and ultimately had become 
Chief of Section Operations of the Antitrust Division, he held tech­
nical responsibility for the case.48 
Judge Kaufman then sought to determine whether the present 
action was sufficiently similar to the former government action so as 
to be considered the same action. He found that the two actions 
were the same because almost every act of attempted monopoliza­
tion alleged in the private complaint also was alleged in the earlier 
Justice Department complaint.49 Although Judge Kaufman's analy­
sis was relatively solid, simply comparing the allegations in the re­
spective complaints is insufficient to determine whether the actions 
are similar. To establish an antitrust cause of action, well defined 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 642. 
46. Id. at 643. 
47. Id. at 649. 
48. Id. at 642. Compare Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 
n.11 (D. Hawaii 1975) (signing a complaint constitutes the exercise of substantial respon­
sibility, except in rare circumstances) and Note, supra note 34, at 661-62 (as general rule 
an attorney on the trial staff level who signs a complaint should be irrebuttably presumed 
to have substantial responsibility for the matters contained therein) with Jordan, supra 
note 9, at 201 (the appropriate perspective is the "rule of reason" which considers such 
factors as office size, office location, and nature of the working relationships in evaluating 
"substantial responsibility"). According to the Model Rules, the question would be 
whether Reycraft had "personally and substantially participated" in the government suit. 
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.ll(a) (Discussion Draft, Jan. 
30, 1980). It seems clear from the facts that he had so participated and, therefore, would 
be disqualified. See note 41 supra. 
49. 501 F.2d at 650. But see Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 318 F. Supp. 145, 147 (D. 
Minn. 1970) (computer industry changed so completely in fifteen years that disqualifica­
tion was not warranted); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algon Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284 
(N.D. Ill.), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978), andrev'd in part on other grounds andaffd inpart sub 
nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cerl. 
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978) (when disqualification is ordered, the lines between the two 
lawsuits are "patently clear" and the action usually involves the same documents or a 
continuation of the same lawsuit); Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 
1316 (D. Hawaii 1975) (finding present action to parallel earlier action because defend­
ants were the same in both actions and the complaints were repeated verbatim). 
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statutory elements must be satisfied by the plaintiff.50 Consequently, 
the causes of action, the complaints, and the discovery in antitrust 
lawsuits will appear to be similar in comparable factual circum­
stances.51 This holds true for most lawsuits brought under any 
closely worded statute. Thus, Judge Kaufman examined the actual 
contents of the documents, rather than their mere facial 
similarities.52 
In any DR 9-101(B) analysis, the final inquiry is whether there 
appears to be any incidence of impropriety.53 The appearance of 
impropriety that concerned Judge Kaufman in General Motors was 
the possibility that, as a former government lawyer, Reycraft's ac­
tions as a public official might have been influenced, or appear to 
have been influenced, by the hope of eventual private employment 
wherein he could uphold or upset that which he had done while a 
government attorney. 54 Thus, the ethical problem raised was "the 
possibility that a lawyer might wield Government power with a view 
toward subsequent private gain."55 Judge Kaufman concluded that 
the appearance of impropriety was created because there existed not 
only substantial responsibility, but also a plain overlap of issues and 
a direct involvement by Reycraft in a similar suit while he was a 
govern,ment employee. Based upon this analysis, Reycraft was 
disqualified.56 
Courts have found that an appearance of impropriety may be 
created in several other situations: When a former government at­
torney gains an otherwise unobtainable advantage over an adversary 
in a private suit;57 when an attorney who drafted or amended ordi­
nances later attacks the constitutionality or validity of those ordi­
nances;58 when a former government attorney, while still in 
SO. SOl F.2d at 650-51. 
51. Id. at 651-52. 
52. Id. at 652-55. 
53. Id. at 649. 
54. Id. at 648-49. 
55. Id. at 650 n.20. 
56. Id. at 642. See notes 40 & 48 supra. 
57. See, e.g., Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 817 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(information advantage); Allied Realty, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 408 F.2d 1099, 
1102 (8th Cir.) (court affirmed disqualification of attorney concluding that purpose of 
Canon 36 was to prohibit attorney from gaining financial advantage through use of infor­
mation obtained as a public official), cerro denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969). The Model Rules 
emphasize that the risk in this area is that public power and discretion will be used to 
benefit the private client. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.ll 
comment (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). 
58. See, e.g., Traylor V. City of Amarillo, 335 F. Supp. 423, 425 (N.D. Tex. 1971) 
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government employ, investigated or had access to confidential 
materials dealing with the lawsuit in which, as a private attorney, he 
has become involved;59 and, finally, when a former government at­
torney attacks either a contract that he drafted or the soundness of a 
legal position that he asserted while in government employ.60 
The focus of the courts has been toward factfinding in any ques­
tion of appearance of evil. Even the series of tests outlined above are 
factual inquiries. The only question of law is whether the factual 
circumstances aniount to the appearance of evil. This question can 
be answered only when the courts look to the purpose of DR 9­
IOI(B): the maintenance of public confidence in the integrity of the 
legal profession. 
The Model Rules eliminate all questions of law and concentrate 
solely on a factual approach. If there is "personal and substantial 
participation" in a matter by a former government lawyer, that law­
yer and all members of his firm are disqualified. 61 Although this 
approach has the virtue of simplicity, it has not yet been shown 
whether the addition of the term "personal" to Judge Kaufman's 
substantial responsibility analysis will be fruitful. If the result is a 
routineproforma analysis to determine whether the former govern­
ment lawyer, for example, had signed the complaint, then nothing 
has been gained.62 
B. DR 4-101(9) 
The attorney-client relationship necessitates the exchange of 
private thoughts; only then can the professional relationship truly 
flourish and grow. Accordingly, most good attorneys demand com­
(court disqualified city attorney who attacked constitutionality of condemnation ordi­
nance that he had amended, defended, and enforced). See generally ETHICS COMM. OF 
THE ASSN. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, OPINIONS, No. 889 (1976). 
59. See, e.g., Allied Realty, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 283 F. Supp. 464, 467 (D. 
Minn. 1968), aJl'd, 408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir.), cerl. denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969) (court dis­
qualified former government lawyer who had investigated and passed upon subject mat­
ter of real estate transaction in prior criminal trials from acting as attorney for plaintiff in 
subsequent civil action seeking to set aside claimed fraudulent mortgage); Hilo Metals 
Co. v. Leamer Co., 258 F. Supp. 23, 27 (D. Hawaii 1966) (court disqualified former 
government employee of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice from acting 
as counsel for corporation which sought damages for antitrust violations because attor­
ney had access to documents related to the present case, had seen relevant confidential 
material, and actually had investigated the subject matter). 
60. See generally Kaufman, supra note 12, at 660. 
61. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.1 I (a) & (e) (Discus­
sion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). See also note 40 supra. 
62. See note 48 supra. 
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plete candor from their clients. With this "baring of the soul," how­
ever, there is a corresponding danger of abuse. It is within this 
context that DR 4-101(B) was designed to function. DR 4-101(B) 
provides: 
Except when permitted under DR 4-lOl(C), a lawyer shall not 
knowingly: (1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client. 
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of 
the client. (3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the ad­
vantage of himself or of a third person, unless the client consents 
after full disclosure.63 
The purpose of DR 4-101(B) is to protect a client from the mis­
use of information acquired in a confidential attorney-client rela­
tionship. The various canons and rules of the Code, however, 
cannot be read in isolation. The ethical problems facing the former 
government attorney, therefore, require an indepth consideration of 
both Canon 9 and Canon 4.64 
An obvious appearance of impropriety is evidenced by the pos­
sible misuse of confidential information.65 It is reasonable to assume 
that one of the functions of DR 9-101(B) is to prevent the appear­
ance of a Canon 4 violation. This function poses a particular prob­
lem for the former government attorney entering private practice. If 
there is an appearance that confidential information was disclosed to 
a government attorney during the course of his public service, he 
runs the risk of being disqualified from handling a case in private. 
practice in which disclosure of such confidences will be harmful to 
the government as a former client and as a party in the pending 
63. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1980). Under the 
Code there are four situations in which a lawyer may reveal confidences and secrets of a 
client: (I) When the lawyer has received the consent of the client affected after full dis­
closure; (2) when disclosure is permitted under the Code or required by law or court 
order; (3) when the confidence or secret involves an intention on the part of a client to 
commit a crime; and (4) when disclosure is necessary to establish or collect a fee or to 
defend the lawyer, his employees, or associates against an accusation of wrongful con­
duct. Id. DR 4-101(C). 
64. See Note, supra note 34, at 655 (most significant reason for existence of both 
DR 9-IOI(B) and DR 4-101(B) is to prevent a breach of trust established to promote total 
disclosure in the professional relationship). 
65. See Jordan, supra note 9, at 191-92 (DR 9-101(B) founded substantially on the 
principles of Canon 4 since the principal reason for disqualifying lawyers with respect to 
former government matters is to prevent the misuse of client confidences); Comment, 
supra note 40, at 1552. The comment to Rule l.ll endorses this view and cites Rule 1.7 
("Confidential Information") and Rule 1.l0 ("Representation Adverse to a Former Cli­
ent") as the significant factors in determining whether a conflict of interest exists for the 
former government lawyer. See also ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr 
Rule 7.1 comment (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). 
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suit.66 
While protecting attorney-client confidentiality and the appear­
ance of a Canon 4 violation are strong public policies, they must be 
balanced against the interest in avoiding interference with the cli­
ent's choice of counsel. Once again, an equitable balance is neces­
sary to retain public confidence in the bar. This confidence, for 
example, may be eroded if disqualification of a chosen attorney de­
prives a litigant of competent counsel needed for a just tria1.67 The 
solutions proposed to reconcile the competing interests in this area 
are nothing more than forms of balancing that reflect the underlying 
tension between the attorney-client privilege and the litigant's right 
to freely chosen counse1.68 
It is logical to start an analysis of a client confidence problem by 
determining whether the attorney-client relationship ever existed. In 
the case of a former government lawyer this becomes an interesting 
question, as the United States in toto was his former client.69 The 
commonsense solution offered by the commentators requires the 
court to ask: Was the attorney a government employee and, if so, 
what were his exact responsibilities?70 
This question, however, is only the threshold inquiry. A party 
moving for disqualification of an attorney under DR 4-101(B) also 
must show that: (1) The previous attorney-client relationship is ad­
verse to the present representation; (2) the subject matter of the two 
relationships is substantially related; and (3) the attorney acquired 
66. Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium AjS v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 
607 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir. 1979); Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 863 (W.D. Mo. 
1980); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 342 (1975) (bal­
ance necessary between the evils of misuse of government position and the government's 
interest in the recruitment of well qualified attorneys). 
67. Note, Ethical Problems for the Law Firm of a Former Government Allorney: 
Firm or IndividuallJisqual!fications?, 1977 DUKE L.l. 512, 514 (attorney disqualification 
does not increase public confidence in the bar when the primary effect of disqualification 
is to interfere with choice of counselor to deprive litigant of competent counsel in com­
plex area of law). See also Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 812 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (Canon 9 does not require absolute disqualification of every privately retained 
attorney in a matter in which attorney had substantial responsibility as a government 
employee). 
68. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 195­
96 (N.D. Ohio 1976), affd, 570 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978) 
(noting the sensitive dilemma ofprotecting the attorney-client relationship without inter­
fering with litigant's choice ofcounsel, court suggested an equitable balance as the neces­
sary approach to the problem). 
69. See Kaufman, supra note 12, at 665. 
70. See Note, supra note 22, at 68, 72. 
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confidential information from the former client.7 1 Although this ap­
pears to place an extremely heavy burden of proof on the former 
client, the presumptions working against the attorney are difficult to 
overcome. 
The central question in a DR 4-101(B) motion to disqualify is 
whether the attorney involved in the present suit had access to confi­
dential information in a prior, related matter. The classic case on 
this point is T. C Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures. 72 T. C The­
atre involved a motion by defendant, Universal Pictures, to disqual­
ify Mr. Cooke from acting as counsel for plaintiff T.C. Theatre 
COrp.73 The motion stemmed from the prior representation of de­
fendant by Cooke in an antitrust suit brought by the United States.74 
In support of its motion to disqualify Cooke, defendant claimed that 
Cooke's prior representation of defendant in the suit brought by the 
United States and the present lawsuit both were based on the same 
charges.75 Defendant further alleged that Cooke, as plaintifi's attor­
ney in the present case, would be proving the same charges against 
which he had defended Universal.76 In this situation a presumption 
71. Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 
607 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1979); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Illuminating Co., 440 
F. Supp. 193,207, (N.D. Ohio 1976), affd, 570 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied,435 
U.S. 996 (1978). The Model Rules handle this problem of utilizing information of a 
former client in a subsequent adverse relationship: 
(a) A lawyer who has represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 
(I) Represent another person in the same or a substantially related 
matter if the interest of that person is adverse in any material respect to the 
interest of the former client; or 
(2) Make use of information acquired in service to the client in a 
manner disadvantageous to the client, whether or not the information is 
confidential as provided in Rule 1.7, unless the information has become 
generally known or accessible. 
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.l0(a) (Discussion Draft, Jan. 
30, 1980). This rule is narrower than DR 4-IOI(B) in two respects: First, it requires the 
client's adverse interest to be material; second, it op(!ns up information once it is gener­
ally known. These are constructive changes, especially the second point regarding the 
government lawyer who works mostly with documents that are public under state and 
federal freedom of information acts. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7 (West 1976). 
Rule 1.7 is the confidential information section most directly analogous to DR 4­
101. Rule 1.10(2), however, applies directly to the use of client information in a subse­
quently disadvantageous manner. See note 65 supra. 
72. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
73. /d. at 266. 
74. /d. 
75. /d. at 267. 
76. Id. at 268. 
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arose that matters of confidence had been disclosed to Cooke.17 No 
showing of actual disclosure was necessary.78 Cooke's argument 
against the motion to disqualify was that defendant was required to 
indicate the precise matters that had been disclosed to him.79 The 
court agreed with defendant, stating that the former client need only 
show that the matters involved in the two representations were sub­
stantially related. If the former client can show substantially related 
matters, the court will assume that there was a prior disclosure of 
confidential matters relating to the present representation.80 
The substantially related test has been used in both the private 
context and in cases involving government attorneys returning to 
private practice.8 ! The analysis in T.C Theatre has been merely 
transplanted, with little doctrinal change, into a different context in 
the government cases.82 This shift of the standard, with no real dis­
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 269. 
79. Id. at 268. 
80. Id. See generally Jordan, supra note 9, at 193-95. In discussing the term "mat­
ter" in the context of DR 9-IOI(B), Jordan concludes that a clear example of the same 
"matter" would be any aspect of the continuation of the previous litigation. In a less 
clear case, he advocates a broad definition of the term in light of the purposes of govern­
mental integrity and favorable public opinion of DR 9-IOI(B). It is clear that this defini­
tion of "matter" would be equally appropriate in determining the breadth of the 
"substantially related matters" test. Another commentator suggests that the misuse of 
confidential information is a specific form of an appearance of impropriety. Comment, 
supra note 40, at 1552. Thus, the standard for determining an appearance of impropriety 
is appropriately whether the attorney will be disqualified from handling a matter in pri­
vate practice over which he had had "substantial responsibility" as a government em­
ployee. Id See also ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 
comment (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980) in which a lawyer's involvement with a spe­
cific transaction of a client is distinguished from the recurrent handling of several generi­
cally similar issues by a lawyer for different clients. 
81. Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 
1977); Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 863 (W.O. Mo. 1980). 
82. In Empire Linotype School, Inc. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 627, 632 
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), the court disqualified an attorney from representing a school with con­
tract claims against the Veterans' Administration because the attorney had handled the 
contracts involved in the litigation while an employee of the Veterans' Administration 
Office. Although the court did not require the government to make a showing of actual 
matters previously disclosed to the attorney, it did require the government to show access 
to material "substantially related" to the present suit. Bul see State v. Brown, 274 So. 2d 
381, 382 (La. 1973) in which an assistant district attorney previously had represented 
defendant at an earlier trial for the same offense subsequently being tried by the district 
attorney, the court presumed that the assistant district attorney had respected his former 
client's confidences. The court, therefore, refused to impute knowledge to the district 
attorney, demanding spec!ftc proof from defendant of actual disclosure by the assistant 
district attorney. 
The Model Rules treat this question as "one of degree of involvement" and ask 
whether the depth of involvement was such that subsequent representation could be re­
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tinction made between the special problems inherent in the public 
bar versus the private bar, has been criticized.83 The real contro­
versy, however, involves the substantially related test itself. 
One particularly valid criticism of the substantially related test 
is that a presumption of disclosure of confidences based upon mere 
proof of a former attorney-client relationship in a substantially re­
lated matter is too stringent. 84 A strict application of the substan­
tially related test not only will result in a presumption of disclosure 
of confidences to the lawyer involved in the former attorney-client 
relationship,85 it also will give rise to a presumption of disclosure 
that is then imputed to that lawyer's present colleagues.86 For exam­
ple, if the former Chief of the Antitrust Division is presumed to have 
had access to matters considered substantially related to the suit in 
question, this presumption of knowledge may then be imputed to 
other members of his firm. Some courts have rejected this strict ap­
proach.87 In addition, recently there have been suggestions regard­
ing alternatives, such as an in camera proceeding in which the court 
determines the content of the prior disclosures. 88 
A need for an alternative to this trap of presumption and impu­
tation clearly exists. A former government lawyer may view himself 
as nothing more than a white elephant capable of disqualifying his 
garded as a "changing of sides." ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 
1.10 (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). See also id. Rule 7.1 comment. 
83. See Kaufman, supra note 12, at 667. Judge Kaufman suggests that different 
standards be used for government and private attorneys. Former government attorneys 
cannot be held to the same rules of imputed knowledge from access to data which bind 
private attorneys having definable clients and law firms. Rather, there should be a fac­
tual showing of actual receipt of knowledge or a strong likelihood of receipt of knowl­
edge. Id. 
84. But see Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium AjS v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, 
Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 191-92 (7th Cir. 1979) (once a substantial relationship is found, it will 
be irrebutably presumed that attorney had access to confidential information). 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 192-93. 
87. In City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 
210-11 (N.D. Ohio), qlf'd, 570 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978), 
the court noted that recent legal precedent has rejected the hard line approach of ir­
rebutably imputing confidential disclosures, actual or presumed, between members of a 
law firm. Moreover, the court rejected the mechanical application of the doctrine of 
vertical responsibility. 
The Model Rules effectively narrow imputation by rejecting per se rules of disquali­
fication and requiring that the participation of the former government lawyer have been 
"personal." See notes 40 & 41 supra. If this prerequisite is satisfied, however, the law­
yer's entire firm is disqualified. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer 
Rules 1.1 I (e), 7.1 (DiSCUSSion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). 
88. Note, supra note 22, at 76. 
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entire firm. The likelihood of this occurring becomes especially 
strong when the language of DR 5-lO5(0) and Model Rule 1.1l(e) 
are considered. 
C. 	 Special Problems Related to the Application oj'Both 

J)R 9-101(B) and J)R 5-105(J)) 

DR 5-lO5(0) provides: "[I]f a lawyer is required to decline em­
ployment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary 
Rule, no partner or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him 
or his firm, may accept or continue such employment."89 
'The problem that DR 5-lO5(0) creates for the government at­
torney is the automatic disqualification of a firm if one of the firm's 
attorneys is disqualified under DR 9-lOl(B).90 The ABA Commis­
sion on Professional Ethics recognized that the automatic disqualifi­
cation ofa firm under DR 5-105 could discourage the recruitment of 
former government lawyers by private firms because of the possibil­
ity of subsequent firm disqualification.91 To prevent this, the ABA 
Committee decided that the court, or any other reviewing body, can 
allow a waiver of the firm's disqualification if the facts do not consti­
tute an appearance of impropriety and the government is convinced 
that the firm will isolate the disqualified attorney.92 
The success of the solution proposed by the Commission, there­
fore, depends on the efficacy of the firm's screening procedure. The 
courts will focus more on the firm's screening procedure than on the 
facts themselves.93 For example, in Kesselhaut v. United States94 the 
court was faced with a request for review of an order disqualifying a 
private law firm because a member of the firm was a former attorney 
for the government who had been disqualified.95 The court noted at 
the outset that the disqualification of an entire law firm because one 
89. 	 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(0) (1980). 
90, Rule l.ll(e) handles firm disqualification in a similar manner and disqualifies 
the entire firm of a disqualified former government lawyer. "If a lawyer is required by 
this rule to decline representation on account of personal and substantial participation in 
a matter, except where the participation was as a judicial law clerk, no lawyer in a firm 
with the disqualified lawyer may accept such employment." ABA MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.ll(e) (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). Rule 7.1 pro­
hibits a lawyer who has left a law firm, including a government legal department, and his 
subsequent associates from adverse representation or disclosing confidences. Id. Rule 
7.1. 
91. 	 ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 342 (1975). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. 	 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam). 
95. Id. at 792. 
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of its members had been disqualified was too harsh and should be 
mitigated by an appropriate screening procedure.96 The court then 
focused on the screening procedure, which provided that the disqual­
ified attorney would have no connection with the case through dis­
cussions or documentary evidence.97 Further, the procedure stated 
that the files would be locked and the keys would only be given out 
on a "need to know" basis.98 Because the disqualified attorney was 
isolated from the case, the trial court's order mandating firm disqual­
ification was vacated.99 
The Kesselhaut court recognized that the purpose behind 
screening is to establish and maintain a balance between freedom 
and necessity.lOO The right of an attorney to practice law and the 
right of a client to his choice of counsel are weighed against the need 
to uphold and maintain the ethical integrity of the profession. lOl 
The inherent flaw in screening, however, is that its success depends 
upon the honesty and moral principles of individuals. Although this 
self-policing frequently is successful, the efficiency of screening 
might not be apparent to the public eye. 102 Nevertheless, the idea 
behind screening is an appropriate alternative to the harsh result of 
disqualification of an entire firm. As the public becomes increas­
ingly aware of this, a more sophisticated form of screening will 
appear. 
D. 	 Other Matters of Concern to the Lawyer Leaving 
Government Service 
The former federal attorney should be aware of considerations 
96. Id. at 793. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 793-94. 
99. Id. at 794. But see Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated 
on other grounds and remanded mem., 101 S. Ct. 1338 (1981). In Cheng, complainant 
alleged that a member of the defense firm was a former attorney in the legal services firm 
presently representing him and had participated in case discussions with other members 
of the staff. Id. at 1053-54. The court noted the existence of a "Chinese Wall," but 
nevertheless disqualified the attorney because of the small size of the firm and the possi­
bility of inadvertent disclosures. Id. at 1057-58. 
100. 	 555 F.2d at 794. 
101. 	 Id. at 793. 
102. For a useful analysis of the relationship between DR 5-105(0) and DR 9­
IOI(B), see Comment, ProfeSSional Responsibility-Disqual!fication of Low Firm Under 
DR 5-I05(D) Unnecessary Where Partner Who Had Formerly Been A Government Attor­
ney Was Effectively Screened From Particpation-Kesselhaut v. United States, 12 SUF­
FOLK L. REV. 189 (1978) (screening generally is effective but cannot eradicate every form 
of impropriety because it depends on the integrity of the individuals involved and will 
become ineffective if those individuals choose to disregard its constraints). 
217 1981] ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
other than those that have evolved, either directly or indirectly, from 
the Code. First, there is the Federal Conflict of Interest Law,103 of 
which three sections are of particular importance to the former fed­
erallawyer. Section 203(a) of the Act prohibits government employ­
ees from receiving compensation of any kind for services rendered in 
any matter in which the United States is a party or has a direct and 
substantial interest. 104 Although this section is more relevant to cur­
rent government attorneys than to former employees, it reflects the 
general thrust of the law and foreshadows the relevant Code sec­
tions. Section 207(a) of the Act prohibits former government attor­
neys from representing private parties in any matter in which the 
attorney substantially participated while in government employ. 105 
The same problems that apply in substantial responsibility under 
DR 9-101(B) are encountered when trying to determine substantial 
participation under section 207(a).I06 
The last relevant section is section 208(a) of the Act. Section 
208(a) provides that an employee of the executive branch of the gov­
ernment or a governmental agency may not participate in a matter in 
which a prospective employer has a financial interest. 107 Finally, the 
former federal lawyer should be aware that federal agencies have 
promulgated rules governing the appearance by former employees 
before those agencies. lOS Federal courts have similar rules pertain­
ing to justices and law c1erks.l09 
III. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
A motion to disqualify should be made immediately after dis­
covery of the facts that warrant apparent disqualification. Unless 
such a motion is made, a party should be held to have waived the 
103. 18 U.S.c. §§ 202-18 (1976). 
104. Id. § 203(a). 
105. Id. § 207(a). 
106. See generally Jordan, supra note 9, at 197-202. (the objectives of the two pro­
visions are almost identical, and courts and ethics committees have produced compatible 
interpretations). 
107. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1976); see B. MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
LAW (1974); Jordan, supra note 9, at 174-89. 
108. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 4.1 (1980) (FTC); 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.735-8, 201.2(e) (1980) 
(SEC); 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.119-.120 (1980) (NLRB). 
109. E.g., SUP. CT. R. 7 (law clerks to justices may not practice before the Supreme 
Court for two years upon leaving clerkship); 1ST CIR. R. 4 (one-year appearance ban). 
See also Pilkington v. Bevilacqua, 632 F.2d 922, 924-25 (1st Cir. 1980) (attorney's fee 
award by district court vacated and remanded for further scrutiny under a more rigorous 
standard because attorney was former law clerk to awarding judge). 
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right110 because allowing a motion to disqualify to be brought at a 
significantly later time would cause a great deal of anxiety to both 
parties. III 
Another general consideration is the Code itself. The Code es­
tablishes the guidelines for the proper cond).lct of attorneys. Con­
trary to popular notion, however, a violation of these guidelines does 
not automatically result in attorney disqualification; this sanction re­
sults solely at the discretion of the judge.1l2 The party moving to 
disqualify for an alleged conflict of interest must prove the following 
facts: (a) That a past attorney-client relationship existed; (b) that 
the subject matter of the attorney's former employment is substan­
tially related to that of his present employment; (c) that the informa­
tion received in the prior relationship was privileged; and (d) that he 
has not waived his right to object to the present employment. 113 
Proving these elements imposes a heavy burden on the moving 
party. The courts frequently consider the subject matter relation to 
former employment in disqualification motions. Most courts hold 
that all circumstances must be examined. I 14 A necessary corollary to 
this demand by the courts is the heavier burden of proof placed on 
the moving party. Certain inferences simultaneously are available to 
the party bringing a disqualification motion. For example, he may 
use the inference that an attorney, formerly associated with a law 
firm, has received confidential information that was transmitted by a 
client to the firm. This inference, however, is capable of rebuttal. I IS 
110. Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 992 
(8th Cir. 1978) (appellants moving to disqualify opponent's counsel waived right to ob­
ject because the motion was made more than two years after appellants knew that the 
former government attorney, who had worked on a closely related case, had been hired 
by plaintiff's law firm). 
Ill. Id. at 992. For example, it may result in one party sitting on his rights while 
the other plunges ahead with trial preparation. 
112. Id. at 991. See also Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
113. See note 110 supra and accompanying text as to waiver of right to object. For 
a discussion of the evidentiary hurdles that must be met by the party moving to disqual­
ify, see Note, supra note 22, at 66. 
114. See notes 17-21 supra. See also Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433,434 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (en banc) (motions to disqualify involve factual determinations, such as 
whether there is a threat of taint, whether screening is adequate, and whether a substan­
tial relationship existed between past and present representations), vacated on other 
grounds and remanded mem., 101 S. Ct. 911 (1981). 
115. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 
751 (2d Cir. 1975) (overruled on the question of applicability by Armstrong v. McAlpin,· 
625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded mem., 101 S. Ct. 911 (1981) 
and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, WI S. Ct. 669 (1981»; United States v. 
Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 354, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
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An order by a federal district court granting or denying a mo­
tion to disqualify an attorney is final. This final order may be ap­
pealed pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1291.116 Although the actual appeal 
procedure is relatively straightforward, the scope of appellate review 
has been the subject of some disagreement. Aetna Casualty and 
Surety Co. v. United States 1l7 is an example of the controversy. 
Plaintiffs in Aetna argued that the scope of review of the appellate 
court was limited to a determination of discretionary abuse by the 
district court. liS The court rejected this argument on the ground that 
the district courts are not necessarily better suited than appellate 
courts to formulate and apply ethical norms. I 19 The court concluded 
that an appellate court could determine whether the district court's 
disqualification order was based on proper ethical considerations. 12o 
It is clear that the appellate courts are dissatisfied with their 
usual limited review in the area of attorney disqualification. J2J This 
may be a healthy attitude, considering the serious public policies at 
stake. 122 It is a dangerous practice, nevertheless, to have an appel­
late tribunal second-guess the factual findings of a trial court. A re­
view of the facts in the district court record is no substitute for the 
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 570 
F.2d 1197, 1200 (4th Cir. 1978); MacKethan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 557 F.2d 
395, 396 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). In Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food 
Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 990 (8th Cir. 1978), appellee contended that an order denying 
a motion to disqualify was not separately appealable pursuant to § 1291. The court held, 
however, that the order was immediately appealable under the "collateral order" excep­
tion to the finality requirement of§ 1291. See also Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 
F.2d 602, 606-07 (8th Cir. 1977) (overruled on the question of appealability by In re 
Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litigation, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980) and Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 101 S. Ct. 669 (1981», cert. denied 436 U.S. 905 (1978). But see 
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on other 
grounds and remanded mem., 10 I S. Ct. 911 (1981) (district court order denying a motion 
to disqualify is not immediately appealable). 
The issue of whether an order refusing to disqualify counsel is immediately appeala­
ble under the "collateral order" doctrine was recently addressed by the Supreme Court. 
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 101 S. Ct. 669, 676 (1981), the Court held that 
orders denying a motion to disqualify opposing party's counsel in civil cases are not 
appealable under § 1291 prior to a final judgment in the underlying litigation. 
117. 570 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir. 1978). 
118. Id. at 1200. But see Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (appellate court rejected the limited review of "abuse of discretion" and ap­
plied the "clearly erroneous" test to issues of fact while carefully examining the ethical 
standards applied by the district court judge). 
119. 570 F.2d at 1200. 
120. Id. See also Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Labo­
ratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 188-89 (7th Cir. 1979). 
121. 570 F.2d at 1200. 
122. Id. at 1202. 
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findings of the district court judge in primus. The best approach is 
one whereby the appellate court gives special consideration to the 
factual findings of the district court, but still reviews the facts and the 
legal tests under the "clearly in error" standard. 123 Finally, if sub­
stantial doubt exists as to the possible creation of an appearance of 
impropriety, these questions should be answered in favor of disqual­
ification. 124 This approach is crucial because its application will help 
to maintain the integrity of the bar.125 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Former government lawyers may be accused of three different 
kinds of improper behavior: The misuse of confidential information; 
the treachery of switching sides; and the abuse of governmental 
power for personal gain. 126 Balanced against these improprieties 
are: The possible restraints on the government's ability to recruit; 
the restrictions on the government lawyer's employment mobility; 
and the possible deprivation of a client's choice of counsel. 127 These 
factors are the common threads that run through consideration of 
the ethical problems involving former government lawyers. All fac­
tors must be weighed in light of the situation at hand and all the tests 
are merely tools to aid in this process. The attorney involved in a 
possible conflict situation should not always force the issue: Early 
withdrawal from representation is preferable to a later, court-or­
dered disqualification. 128 
A more hard line solution can be found by resorting to DR 9­
101(B). The approach under DR 9-101(B) suggests that no former 
government attorney may accept private employment in cases that 
were pending before his agency during his years of service. DR 5­
101(D) would extend the attorney's disqualification to include all the 
partners in his firm. As previously discussed, however, this ulti­
mately would injure the public because qualified applicants would 
123. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. ChrySler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 
758 (2d Cir. 1975) (Adams, J., concurring) (overruled on the question of appealability by 
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded 
mem., 101 S. Ct. 911 (1981) and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 101 S. Ct. 669 
(1981». 
124. Id. at 757. 
125. Id. 
126. Comment, supra note 40, at 1549. 
127. Id. at 1556. 
128. Note, supra note 22, at 83 (early withdrawal always is preferable to later dis­
qualification because disqualification implies impropriety). 
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be discouraged from entering government service. 129 
The solution proposed by this article considers the facts of each 
case before applying the rules of the Code. Unlike the hard line 
approach, the final decision under these standards generally depends 
upon certain factual inquiries made by the court. The balance that 
this approach brings to the inquiry is preferable to an absolutist 
view. As is the case in any factual determination with subsequent 
application of legal tests, divergent results, however, are bound to 
occur. 130 
One pragmatic approach taken concerning ethical problems is 
that of screening under DR 5-105(D). Under this procedure a gov­
ernment agency would screen former employees before they would 
be allowed to practice before that agency. Most commentators favor 
screening over absolute disqualification,l3I but with the caveat that 
the screening decision be made by a judge or an independent com­
mittee.132 This is the preferable approach and it recently has been 
endorsed by one federal court. 133 The problem of creating an in­
dependent review committee without also creating a burdensome ad­
ministrative procedure still exists. 
In the final analysis, a balanced approach that gives careful and 
thorough consideration to all the facts and circumstances represents 
the best solution to the problem of attorney disqualification. This 
inquiry is difficult, but the courts will do everything in their power to 
be meticulous in this regard. Courts have always demanded, and 
will continue to demand, lucid and cogent arguments from both par­
ties. The courts then will apply the current ethical mores developed 
to embody well proven judicial tests. There will be an inevitable 
tension between the courts' traditional tendency to use well demon­
strated and well proven precedent and their conscious attempts to 
129. See Note, supra note 67, at 525-26 (exploring the possibility of total disqualifi­
cation and noting that this approach would gready hamper government recruitment and 
would impose substantial hardships on past and present government attorneys). See also 
Comment, supra note 40, at 1547-48. 
130. E.g., Comment, supra note 5, at 1043 (courts and agencies have difficulty as­
sessing the substantial responsibility of a former employee because the party moving for 
disqualification usually has difficulty producing !he extensive facts regarding agency pro­
cedure and events necessary to ascertain !he former employee's responsibility in a mat­
ter). See generally Jordan, supra note 9, at 193-201. 
131. Note, supra note 67, at 529. 
132. Comment, supra note 102, at 202. 
133. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam) 
(screening procedure of law firm judicially endorsed). But see Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 
F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds and remanded mem., 101 S. Ct. 1338 
(1981). 
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keep the ethical standards current. If a correct decision is humanly 
possible, it has the best chance of occurring in such surroundings. 
